AnthonyB

Is it the only stair or would the floors above have access to a second stair?

Sounds more like designed for sheltered accommodation. These operate audible full evacuation in common areas with stay put in flats (so common system shouldn't be heard). Flats then have a local Grade D system in each just for protection of the flat occupier (which in sheltered would be linked to telecare) Whilst the common system doesn't need to go in the flats at all it's not uncommon for the common system to have a detector (no sounder) in each flat hall ways as a back up in case a flat catches fire whilst the tenant is out or they don't respond. If it should be a complete full evacuate block including the flats then the only main difference would be the common detector in the flat hallway should also have a sounder - no need to try and link the Part D systems

Is that metal? If so it's already in a non combustible housing so could be accepted.

The service visit only need test a sounder operates at all: "k) All fire alarm devices should be checked for correct operation. It should be confirmed that visual fire alarm devices are not obstructed from view and that their lenses are clean. NOTE 9 This test is intended to ensure that every fire alarm device operates in response to a fire alarm signal. It is not intended that sound pressure level measurements are made." This extract explains the relation of the weekly test to sounders: "The following recommendations are applicable. a) Every week, a manual call point should be operated during normal working hours. It should be confirmed that the control equipment is capable of processing a fire alarm signal and providing an output to fire alarm sounders, and to ensure that the fire alarm signal is correctly received at any ARC to which fire alarm signals are transmitted. It is not necessary to confirm that all fire alarm sounder circuits operate correctly at the time of this test. NOTE 2 It is essential that any ARC is contacted immediately before, and immediately after, the weekly test to ensure that unwanted alarms are avoided and that fire alarm signals are correctly received at the ARC. NOTE 3 The user needs to take account of the manufacturer’s recommendations, particularly when battery powered devices are being tested, e.g. within radio-linked fire detection and fire alarm systems. b) The weekly test should be carried out at approximately the same time each week; occupants should then be instructed that they should report any instance of poor audibility of the fire alarm signal. In systems with staged alarms incorporating an “Alert” and an “Evacuate” signal, the two signals should be operated, where practicable, sequentially in the order they would occur at the time of a fire (i.e. “Alert” and then “Evacuate”). c) In premises in which some employees only work during hours other than that at which the fire detection and fire alarm system is normally tested, an additional test(s) should be carried out at least once a month to ensure familiarity of these employees with the fire alarm signal(s)."

There are, but the reference for their use that I could swear used to be in BS5839-1 I can't find in the current edition, meaning it would need to be a variation. Not impossible, but it's not a prison (although it might have some DOLs powers) where such a thing might be routine. Doesn't rule it out fully though.

If there is a party wall liable to give 60 minutes fire resistance between the main building and flat then the assumption would have to be that the flat would operate stay put if the adjacent house was on fire, as escape through a high risk room (kitchen) would not normally be allowed as the sole escape route - is the flat totally landlocked with no external windows for escape in a different direction?

Every building needs one (even if empty or derelict, the legislation was drafted in such a way to ensure this) , however whether it needs a single report per building or one covering several is a point of much debate. It may be that larger distinct buildings on a site need separate reports, smaller groups of outbuildings can share one. There is no right or wrong answer.

Sounds like the design has been done in line with residential fire engineering calculations for open plan kitchens with the cooker at least 1.8m from the escape route. These calculations do assume that there is an LD1 alarm system (smoke/heat alarms in every room and hall other than toilets/bathrooms) and a residential sprinkler system, which I'm guessing you don't? Do the bedrooms have escape windows? It's not beyond possibility that the existing layout you inherited on purchase was itself unauthorised without building regs approval - it's not uncommon for previous owners to have knocked around internal layouts without going through the right processes.

Broadly (as it can only be so as the legislation is functional, not specific and prescriptive) any final fire exit not in daily use as the main entrance that could be obstructed externally should be signed "Keep Clear - Fire Exit" using mandatory signage. 14.—(1) Where necessary in order to safeguard the safety of relevant persons, the responsible person must ensure that routes to emergency exits from premises and the exits themselves are kept clear at all times. (2) The following requirements must be complied with in respect of premises where necessary (whether due to the features of the premises, the activity carried on there, any hazard present or any other relevant circumstances) in order to safeguard the safety of relevant persons— (g)emergency routes and exits must be indicated by signs;

Escape through open plan kitchen/diners is already an option in Building Regs guidance as long as: i. The travel distance from the flat entrance door to any point in any habitable room is a maximum of 9m. ii. Cooking facilities are remote from the main entrance door and do not impede the escape route from anywhere in the flat. How far is the cooker from the entrance lobby?

A few bits of info needed: Do both buildings evacuate simultaneously? Do people regularly go between the buildings during the day?

Shoddy job not being properly sealed at edges - if set up for simultaneous evacuation it would only need to be 30 minutes fire resistance at the most. If not installed correctly you could argue if may fail prematurely at the edges

If it's a stay put block of flats you would need AOV. If you are a MO which operated simultaneous evacuation with a mixed fire alarm system you don't. ADB is not law or regulation, just one method of meeting Building Regs and other approaches are allowed as long as they meet the functional requirements of the law (suitable alarm and escape, compartmentation, internal & external fire spread, fire service facilities, etc)

If the correct outdoor rated cable is used e.g. FP400 or armoured it shouldn't need further protection

If it's just water & soil pipework and is fire stopped where required (e..g between floors) then it can be argued they don't need the same protection as the electrical cupboard.

It's not an ideal set up and your point is very accurate, but without seeing the premises and their risk assessment it's difficult to say it's 100% wrong although it's possible.

Linked balconies split by kick panels or doors are very 'old school' means of escape popular in large estates built in the 1960's. Current fire safety guidance addresses the situation this way "The provision of alternative exits via linking balconies, pass-doors between adjoining flats and break-out panels within the flat has featured in previous guidance and can be found in many existing blocks of flats. However, these arrangements are no longer recommended. Escape via linking balconies, or pass doors between neighbouring flats, was a commonly accepted alternative escape arrangement under previous benchmark standards and can be found in many existing blocks of flats. However, these arrangements are no longer recommended for the design of new flats. In most of these situations, the linking balcony, and pass doors, were shared by the residents of two adjoining flats. In some other situations, more than two flats shared the linking balcony but, in all cases, there was a need to gain access into a neighbour’s flat to reach an alternative exit route. The difficulties of ensuring access into, and exit from, an adjoining flat to reach an alternative exit are obvious and cannot be relied on with any degree of certainty to be available at all times. Despite the above, in many existing flats, the provision of other, more suitable alternative exit routes, such as common balconies or stairways, will be impractical to achieve. In these situations, either one of the other two approaches (limited travel distance or protected entrance hallway) should be adopted, or compensatory measures will need to be considered. The latter include: • pass doors between internal rooms to access a protected exit route • additional automatic detection to a Category LD2 [hallway, kitchen, principle habitable room] or even LD1 standard [all rooms in the flat other than toilets/bathrooms] • a sprinkler, or other suitable fixed automatic suppression, system. However, there may be circumstances where, even with these additional measures, the access to the linking balcony or the pass doors might still be retained for use as a last resort.

Compartmentation survey by a specialist company - although some would be obvious and easy to check if the assessor actually tried to look.

Insurance is nothing to do with legal compliance, which often sets a lower bar. An insurer needs to protect their premiums received from claims so as to stay in business and make a profit. As such insurers will set higher requirements in order to prevent, contain and supress fire - which will include suppression systems in kitchens. As they are the ones taking the risk they are entitled to set whatever criteria they wish regardless of minimum legal requirements (which don't require them as a matter of course). The UK is notorious for low standards in many fire safety areas - if you were in the US all your clients cooking food would have had to have had suppression systems to meet the minimum legal requirements there for over half a century. There are multiple manufacturers of suppressions systems in a variety of designs for different sized kitchens - they should shop around rather than just be quoted for 'Ansul' systems, which are the most well known.

https://www.thefpa.co.uk/training/passive-fire-protection-training/understanding-fire-doors

You really need a copy of BS7273-4 or an industry guide to it - too much to post here!

It isn't contradictory and full complies with BS5499-4 Code of practice for escape route signing

Could the fire spread from the cupboard into the building and thus be a risk to people? If so no storage. If not then it's bad practice, may upset your insurers and could lead to further damage in the event of a fire but could arguably not be a breach of legislation. It's still preferable to keep it clear though.

As you have found out. If your procedure for ensuring doors are unlocked from the out of hours fastenings falls short you will be breaking the legislation, whilst it works you are fine.

1. Would the lock fail to safe and release the door if the cable is burnt through or otherwise affected by heat? If so, it doesn't have to fire resistant 2. No, this is the old method from the last century and is deprecated 3. You should have a copy of BS5839-1:2017 & BS 7273-4:2015+A1:2021 if doing this sort of work, these are the standards professionals should work to and are judged against in court - these would answer all your questions.