AnthonyB

Internal exits via high risk rooms are usually a no-no and come under heavy scrutiny by inspecting officers when targeting commercial premises with sleeping accommodation. The whole reason for the external escape is likely to be due to the unsuitable internal route.

Internal doors would have been fire doors even when your house was built - Building Regulations are such that you must not make anything to a lesser standard than when originally approved. Whether an insurer would use this to reject or reduce a claim is up to the individual insurer, it depends on the wording of the policy. Similarly it depends on how in depth a surveyor is as to whether they would flag this up on a home buyers survey.

If that's just an external door, then based on the picture it does not require to be a fire resisting door set.

BS7273-4 is your initial guide here. It's also covered in the government risk assessment guides & Approved Document B. In Care Homes you sometimes see some of the failsafe's omitted to prevent dementia patients wandering off in an emergency - as evacuation is staff led you see the break glasses but the fire alarm link isn't active .

That's up to the designer, usually in conjunction with the risk assessor, every element above that required for L3 is specific to the design intent for that building - some would cover it, others might not, but both could be correct!

If they aren't fire doors in any shape or form then yes - if it's just that they aren't certified, not necessarily depending on the size & layout of the block. However the age of the doors can be critical too - note this from the latest statutory guidance from the Government: It is reasonable to assume that composite flat entrance doors manufactured after late 2018 have adequate fire resistance. However, this might not be the case if the doors were manufactured before this time. After the Grenfell Tower fire in 2017, a composite flat entrance door installed at Grenfell Tower achieved only 15 minutes’ fire resistance when tested. The door was manufactured by Manse Masterdor (a company that no longer exists), and a number of the company’s composite flat entrance doors, although designed to provide 30 minutes’ fire resistance, failed to do so when tested. This led to tests of a range of manufacturers’ composite fire doors by Government. It was found that, depending on the manufacturer and the model of door, the fire resistance of these doors ranged from eight minutes to over 30 minutes. Common points of failure were letterboxes and glazing (e.g. as a result of manufacturing defects, such as in the means of securing the glazing). Where the point of failure was the letterbox, remedial work can often be carried out by the manufacturer or a specialist contactor on site. This might also be possible in the case of the glazing. In case of doubt, advice of the manufacturer should be sought. A further issue is that the fire resistance of many composite doors was found to be different according to whether the door was tested from what would be the “common parts side” or the “flat side”; this was because, when originally tested, the doors were only tested from the “flat side”. If it can be confirmed (e.g. from documentation or liaison with the manufacturer/supplier) that the doors were supplied after late 2018, there should not be an issue, as the composite door industry doors are now tested from both sides. In the case of doors manufactured before 2018, you should seek further information regarding their likely fire resistance. The Government have published the results of their tests on specific manufacturers’ products, (www.gov.uk/government/publications-fire-door-testing-grp-composite-test-results) and information can be sought from the manufacturer or supplier of the doors. In the case of these “legacy” doors, it is normally acceptable for adequate fire resistance to be provided from the “flat side”, as it is not expected that there will be a serious fire, of the severity used in fire resistance testing, within the common parts. Provided that the doors would have been purchased as 30 minute fire-resisting doors, from the perspective of risk and compliance with fire safety legislation, no immediate action is normally necessary, provided the fire resistance of the doors is, at least, around 15-20 minutes; the doors should be replaced over time as part of routine maintenance. If you are in doubt regarding the adequacy of the fire resistance of composite flat entrance doors, you should seek the advice of a specialist, such as a third-party certificated fire risk assessor or fire safety consultant.

0No - it's valid to want to avoid false alarm activations, but technology is such (& has been for some time) that fire alarm systems can have an investigation period with only a local alarm on a smoke detector activating, with the failsafes of a timer which will sound all alarms if the system isn't silenced after a set time, or if a second detector activates or if a call point activates. Just silencing and relying on a human is risky and depending on system type and configuration can stop other detectors and call points on the zone being investigated from being able to activate the alarm. Deaths and prosecutions have resulted from premature silencing of systems.

Whatever non fire resisting cabling suits the situation. It's an urban myth EL cabling needs to be fire resistant (the one exception being for slave fittings off a central back up power source such as a central battery, inverter or generator) as should fire damage the cable it will failsafe onto it's internal battery unlike fire alarm devices which would just fail.

They are using the obsolescent LACORS Fire Safety Guide which has this view. The guide is being rewritten at the moment and it will be interesting to see if this approach is retained. Bear in mind though that a new build house or flat in England with a protected stair or hall with only detection in the escape route (or best escape route, kitchen and living room) would only require internal FD30 doors (no smoke brush/fin) so the principle isn't just confined to the older HMO guidance.

If you are trapped such that you are close enough to the building to only be in a relative place of safety as oppose to a place of ultimate safety then you will need onwards egress without the use of a key or code. Depending on the numbers and type of person needing to use the gate will determine if you need an EN 1125 panic exit device (push bar) or an EN 179 emergency exit device (push pad or lever handle). Usually you need a panic device if over 60 persons or persons not familiar with the premises (e.g. public) are using it.

I'm afraid the last poster is out of date - arrows even for final exits became mandatory in all the exit signage standards many years ago with the BS/ISO signage. As you are passing straight on through the door the arrow should point upwards in accordance with the signage standards for use of arrows although a down arrow on an existing sign is unlikely to cause confusion so unless you want to be pedantic there is no need to rush to change them.

The external walls and arguably the landing do come under the Order

£200,000 / 64 is over £3000 per door. That's a lot of money to most people.

Not for an existing legacy building - sound, well constructed and close-fitting conventional doors suffice under the current guidance (HOUSING – FIRE SAFETY Guidance on fire safety provisions for certain types of existing housing). The Fire Safety Order would primarily apply to this block in respect to the external walls only and regardless of the layout doesn't apply to the interior of dwellings

A decent fire risk assessment would advise. The official Government Guidance (which if you follow is now proof of compliance following the strengthening of the legal status of the guides) Depending on the height and layout of the block the guidance allows the use of original doors (to a suitable minimum standard), original doors with modernisation (adding intumescent strips and cold smoke seals), or in some situations requires modern FD30S doorsets.

Usually small places of assembly, due to the public presence, need at least a Category M fire alarm system of call points and sounders although if very small you could use the argument for small workplaces on one level where if a shout of fire can clearly be heard throughout that suffices. If the flats have the 60 minutes separation & separate access there would be no need for an alarm in the restaurant for their benefit either (unless it's a block with unsatisfactory cladding with a temporary evacuate policy)

In theory yes if required, the travel into an adjoining compartment helps reset the travel distance clock as well similar to reaching a storey exit.

I think this has already been answered elsewhere on this forum?

A couple of q's: - Are they different fire compartments? - Are they part of the same occupancy?

In which case yes to both as per paragraph 22.2(c) of BS5839-1:2017

You are better asking at the forum at firealarmengineers.com (manuals are on here too) It will be a Morley ZXe panel, but as a Chubb badged version usually has a different engineer access code. Software is apparently old MS-DOS based Fire 3, 4 or 5 unless it's one that has had new firmware to Fire 6 The manual shows you can programme text, etc, from the front end in Level 3.

Their main purpose is to provide smoke control, particularly on longer corridors, so they need to be suitably smoke sealing. Just because they are 40 years old doesn't in itself mean they are no good and can't be remediated - I work with several schools with large legacy estates and lots of doors (many of which in schools don't actually need to be fire doors) and if they had to automatically replace every door set in one fell swoop they'd go bust. A good FRA will detail which doors are a priority, which doors need to even be fire doors under schools fire safety guidance and a good fire door contractor will be able to remediate doors depending on the nature of the issues rather than take a pass/fail/whole new doorset required limited approach many who have entered the trade in the last few years are constrained to.

Or put a new second final exit in the outer wall of the event space unit? Evacuating a public place of assembly through a workshop area is a non starter.

What category is the system intended to meet?

Are these cross corridor doors or enclosing stairs?